hehehe...Thanks for the scenario Two Tales!
There are numerous big chemical plants in the Ohio River Valley, just a few ridges to the East of me, and accidents are rather common. Although it does not appear that the fertilizer factory in your scenario had their act together, I am happy to say that the emergency planners and responders who I have met from the plants in the Belpre, Ohio area were experienced emerg. response professionals. They have well developed Hazmat teams and it appears that there is good communication with the neighboring community leaders, responders and citizens. I suspect there are still challenges but the reality of the risk and threat takes their level of seriousness related to emerg. preparedness and response to a whole other level in that area.
The beauty of the National Incident Management System, emergency operation plans, etc. is that everyone knows exactly what their roles and responsibilities entail. The details of what any particular agency/ responder would need to do would depends on their respective roles and responsibilities within that system.
In an ideal world, all such individuals would be aware of the response plans and related responsibilities. (I just about got on my soapbox about the reality...but I will spare you.)
A disaster is always a disaster but advance preparations can reduce the variables and maximize the effectiveness of a response.
In this scenario, one would hope that factory and town were well prepared for this type of disaster given the high degree of risk and that the response would run like clock work. However, we already know that worker #1 did not know about or follow response protocols, if there were any.
We can therefore suspect that the emergency mitigation and response plans at the factory were not developed, practiced, or adhered to in the pre-incident phase. We can also suspect that barriers, diversionary paths and collection basins were not installed to protect the town's water supplies. (Where were EPA and OSHA?)
Moreover, we can suspect that city leaders, responding agencies, and community residents were not adequately prepared either.
A review of Two Tales' Scenario (let me know if I didn't get it straight):
Background Facts:
December Avg. Day Temp: 17 F / Avg. Night Temp: O F
Ohio Town
10,000 people
Water supply: 100 yr old wells at base of Factory Hill (probably shallow wells)
Dr. Doolittle Hospital 37 miles from town
Fertilizer Factory
1.3 miles northwest of the center of town (within town limits)
60 ft higher in elevation than the town, atop Factory Hill
100 K sq ft/ “L” shaped plant
Old oil burner and steam heating system
2 K gallon oil tank
60 K water tank
Employs 5000 people from the town
3 full shifts
Scenario:
December 19th at the plant
~ 2300 hrs (The end of 2nd shift/beginning of 3rd shift)
Worker 1
Discovers a good sized pool of fuel oil on the floor of the plant
(Weakness/terrorism?)Calls maintenance boss
(strength in that he called anyone, but weakness since he should have been able to activate a trained factory hazmat crew) and leaves a message
(Weakness)Cleans up the spill with old rags and paper towels
(Weakness)Disposes oily rages in 55 gal drum
(Stupidity, lack of common sense, big Weakness)Goes back to work
(lack of knowledge, training and follow through - Weakness)~0100 hrs
Worker 2 detects smoke
(weakness...no automatic smoke alarms, automatic suppression systems)Calls shift supervisor, no response
(Weakness, supervisor should have been wearing a pager; smoke in a hazardous materials plant should automatically trigger response and evacuation)Lead man & Worker 2 Investigate the source of smoke
(weakness...emerg. response/hazmat crew should have been doing the investigation, moreover evacuation orders should have been issued immediately)Discover the store room full of smoke (Did they know what they were doing? Did they know that opening the door to the store room could have made the fire much worse, caused explosion, etc. Had they donned any protective gear? Doesn't sound like it.)
Lead man issues Evacuation Order via PA Alarm system
(Should have been issued immediately or automatically triggered by smoke alarm system but in this case his decision would be regarded as a Strength since at least he finally issued the order.)Speakers disabled (accident or design?)
(Weakness/terrorism?)Some workers did not hear evacuation alarm
(Weakness, should have also been flashing evacuation lights)Lead man calls Town’s Vol. Fire Dept.
(possible Weakness but at least he called someone; 911 dispatch would have been better choice, if available, to activate and mobilize response)All but a few workers are evacuated
(weakness..why weren't ALL workers evacuted to great distance? Were these few workers part of a factory emerg. response team (doubtful) and if so why did they not don gas masks, grab an appropriate fire suppressant/extinguisher, and take care of the smoking barrel before it burst into flames?)The Town alarm triggered
(strength if it worked, was audible and the public was pre-informed, prepared and knew what to do or not do)Vol. fire personnel rush to their station in 0 degree weather with icy roads
('rushing' could prevent them from being adequately dressed and create a safety hazard and therefore be another weakness in the response)The fire in the drum with smoking rags turns into a raging blaze
Fire heats the
leaking fuel oil pipe that feeds burner
(big weakness)- Heat/pressure builds in the pipe
- shuts down the burner
- Continual heat/pressure pushes through the nozzles
- Oil spills onto surrounding surfaces
- Back pressure in pipe builds
- Oil flow pushes back into the tank
- Tank pressure increases
(Big weakness, should never have had a leaking pipe; should have had automatic fuel shut off valves or factory emergency responders should have immediately shut off fuel oil line at tank.)The fuel oil pipe fails
(weakness)Fuel oil flows outward to the floor and catches fire
(weakness)Pallets of stored chemicals and raw materials in vicinity and catch on fire
(weakness; should have been stored in secure area-not near fuel oil lines)Chemical based explosion levels most of the plants and bldgs ½ mile from plant
Water tank ruptured
60,000 gals water released over plant
(considered a strength in the scenario related to firefighting efforts but depending on the chemicals, the water could have also catalyzed additional chemical reactions, intensifying the explosive characteristics and creating plumes of toxic fumes. Also a weakness, as mentioned above, since water diversion pathways, barriers, and collection basins were not constructed to protect the towns' water supply)Flames visible for miles
Explosion heard and felt at Dr. Doolittle Hospital 37 miles away
Vol. Fire Dept. Squad Leader
Calls for assistance of neighboring town fire companies
(Possible weakness: who/how did he call for assistance? Did he call the dispatcher to alert the EMA director to the need for outside assistance and to open the EOC? Were MOUs on the books with these other fire depts?)Town’s Water supply contaminated by Fuel and chemicals
(Big weakness)What must responders, rescue workers, relief aid personnel know and do?It depends on their respective roles and responsibilities as outlined in the emergency operation plans and per NIMS.
Who are the Players?Local Fire Dept Squad Leader: Incident Commander
Command Staff, General Staff
Possible Unified Command
Multi-agency Fire Response; possible Unified Command
HazMat Team
Decon units
Local Emergency Planning Committee LEPC
Facility Emergency Cooridinator
County Emergency Management Agency/Director
EPA
Law Enforcement
FBI (could be terrorism)
Dept. of Ag
Health Dept.
EMS
Dr. Doolittle Hospital personnel
Regional Medical Response System
Evacuation Annex coordinator, possibly school superintendent
(small town, may need MOUs with other schools for buses)
Mass Care:
County Job & Family Services
Red Cross
Salvation Army
Citizen Corps
Animal rescue team
HAM radio: ARES/RACES
Skywarn Weather observer
(How could other citizen/business groups assist if not already part of the established response systems? What would be appropriate for the Athens' Own Emergency Mobile field kitchen if Red Cross/Salvation Army/EOC, etc. did not request services?)Political leaders:
Mayor
City Council
Township Trustee presidents
County Commissioners
Governor
Liaisons and Public Information Officers/Media
Regional Poison Control Centers 1-800-222-1222
National Response Center 1-800-424-8802
National Pesticide Information Center: 800-858-7378
What must we know? Pre-incident
(not everyone needs to know all of these things in and out but all responders shoule at least be very familiar with the overview and know their respective roles. They should also be in good physical health if they are responsible for fire/hazmat and other strenuous duties):-NIMS/Incident Command, Unified Command Systems
-Factory Emergency Preparedness, Mitigation, Response plans (MSDS info)
-Emergency Operation Plans (individual, agency, county, regional, state, federal)
-Emergency Operation Center plans and protocols
-Joint Information Center plans and protocols
-Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT analysis) from previous drills and exercises
Incident:
Who needs to be activated and called to the EOC (Emergency Operation Center)?
The following are things that the Incident Commander, other Command staff and Annex Coordinators are going to need to know to develop the incident action plan, make decisions, mobilize resources and delegate duties.
This information should be moving through the EOC so everyone is informed and on the same page:
-Fire/Plume (visible cloud)?
-Odor? …retreat immediately
-Real time Wind speed and direction
-Types of chemicals, raw materials, possible threats related to combined ingredients and catalysts (evacuation (probably given the town's low location and the propensity of some chemical fumes to be heavier than air and to settle in low areas) or shelter-in place?)
-Hot zone (exclusion zone), decontamination zone
-Other potentially hazardous/explosive materials in area
-Number of injured; look for injured at a distance due to BLEVE: Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosions and potential for metal and other objects to have been propelled into surrounding area.
-Number of evacuees
-Evacuation routes, Shelter locations
-Farms, livestock in vicinity
-Neighboring communities
-Surface and Groundwater flows (hydrologic information)
-Crisis Communication: approved releases of information with education and directives regarding health and safety
Post-Incident:
Protocols for testing and decontaminating soil and water; area could be contaminated for an extended period of time.
Could make area uninhabitable and necessitate bans on agricultural products.
Determining safe return time-lines if possible.
Arranging for alternate water supplies, drilling deep wells may be possible.
Arranging for the safe disposal of dead animals if necessary
Information to be used in a transparent After-Action Evaluation and SWOT analysis with identified improvement strategies
Legal ramifications, state and federal emergency declarations/financial aid and reimbursement.
What must we do? As responders we must know that our families/children are prepared, have a plan, and that they know what to do in various circumstances. An out-of-area contact person should be pre-arranged for communications.
Responders must also be prepared for assigned duties at all times, dress appropriately, drive safely and follow instructions.
Adhere to the safety and response protocols; follow the plan, chain of command, and assigned duties.
The Incident Commander (fire chief) will be calling the shots unless other circumstances such as a terrorist incident dictates FBI lead. The immediate supervisors will be directing individual efforts however common sense and the ability to make emergency decisions on the ground (if absolutely necessary) is also vital.
Responders should do their best and refrain from putting themselves in harm's way. They should not strive to be heros.
If in the vicinity but not trained in Hazmat response:
Ensure personal safety! Evacuate!
If in vicinity and a trained fire/hazmat responder: Keep distance and remain upwind… Do not be downwind. Assume defensive position. Do not enter contaminated area. Do not put self in harm’s way. Apply protective gear if available.
(Be very attentive to shifts in wind patterns and any sensations, i.e. tingling, burning skin, eyes, odors, tastes, but know it may be too late. Get the h*** out of the area, establish radio/phone contact for decon instructions, get out of contaminated clothing, rinse areas with clean water if available and directed to do so (this is not appropriate for some chemicals), head toward the decontamination area if established and/or seek medical attention immediately! )
Make immediate radio/phone contact with 911 dispatch or assigned supervisor.
Use binoculars to assess situation, i.e. indications of wind direction/speed, look for placards, injured individuals, potential for additional explosions, dead birds, animals, path of runoff and deluge from water tank. (Do not try to rescue people in contaminated area until directed to do so.)
Collect information, call or radio information per protocols and follow instructions.
Take notes as appropriate during the response to be utilized when giving reports and during the after-action evaluation.
Post-Incident: Seek medical care and/or peer support services (CISM) if needed. Reflect upon the response and identify personal strengths/weaknesses, devise improvement strategy. Participate in agency after-action evaluation, participate in county/regional after action evaluation.
Take steps to further develop skills and home/family preparedness plans.
Take personal responsibility, get informed, involved, and mobilized to ensure community safety.
Elect public officials who take preparedness seriously, ensure adequate post-incident health care for responders, and hold public leaders accountable. Do not assume they are doing what they are suppose to be doing, do not become complacent.
Insist that such factories are adhering to regulations and taking preparedness seriously. Encourage public officials to strengthen hazardous material regulations, give OSHA back its teeth, and elect officials who are not receiving payment from industry representatives. ( See
www.ens-newswire.com/ens/apr2002/2002-04-30-05.asp for a story on how George W. Bush killed a proposal to tighten hazardous material regulations.)
What did I miss? Any other suggestions, comments?
What do citizens need to know? What do citizens need to do in such situations?
Thanks for the exercise! kj